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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING
Plaintiffs/appellants Bigler and the Utah Taxpayers
Association ("UTA") and defendants/appellees Vernon and Payson
City ("Payson City") have previously consented to the appearance
of Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City") as amicus curiae as
required by Rule 25, Utah R.App.P.
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
§78-2-2(3)(f), Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should this Court recognize a "legislative/

administrative-ministerial" dichotomy in the setting of tax
levies by local governments?
2.

Is the setting of a "tax levy" subject to a citizen

referendum pursuant to either §20-11-21(2), U.C.A., or Article
VI, Section 1(2) of the Constitution of the State of Utah?
3.

Is the prohibition of referendums on tax levies provided

by Section 20-11-21(2) unconstitutional pursuant to Article VI,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution?
4.

Is the setting of a municipal tax levy a matter of

"state-wide concern"?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented by amicus are purely legal questions;
therefore, no deference is accorded to the District Court's
decision.

Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 821 P.2d 457

(Utah 1992).

To the extent that the constitutionality of §20-11-

21(2) U.C.Ae is attacked by UTA, the statute should be "presumed

to be valid, until the contrary is shown beyond all reasonable
doubt."

State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P,2d

388, 389 (1903).

See, also, State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124 (Utah

1975) and Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975),
cert, denied, 425 U.S. 915 (1976).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Applicable provisions of the Utah State Constitution
A,

Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1:
The Legislative power of the State shall be
vested:
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as
hereinafter stated:

The legal voters or such fractional part
thereof as may be provided by law, of any
legal subdivision of the State, under such
conditions and in such manner and within such
time as may be provided by law, may initiate
any desired legislation and cause the same to
be submitted to a vote of the people of said
legal subdivision for approval or rejection,
or may require any law or ordinance passed by
the law making body of said legal subdivision
to be submitted to the voters thereof before
such law or ordinance shall take effect.
B.

Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 5(a):
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or
other municipal corporation, but may, by law,
vest in the corporate authorities thereof,
respectively, the power to assess and collect
taxes for all purposes of such corporation.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Constitution, political
subdivisions may share their tax and oth€>r
revenues with other political subdivisions as
provided by statute.
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2.

Applicable State statutes;
A.

Utah Code Ann. §20-11-21, reads as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this
chapter, the legal voters of any county,
city, or town, in numbers required by this
chapter, may initiate any desired legislation
and cause it to be submitted to the governing
body or to a vote of the people of the
county, city, or town for approval or
rejection, or may require any law or
ordinance passed by the governing body of the
county, city or town to be submitted to the
voters before the law or ordinance takes
effect.
(2) (a) The legal voters of any county,
city, or town may not initiate budgets or
changes in budgets, or tax levies or changes
in tax levies.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or
town may not require any budget or tax levy
adopted by the governing body of the county,
city or town to be submitted to the voters.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Proceedings before the District Court.
The City adopts the "Proceedings" statement submitted by

Payson City.
II.

Statement of Facts.
The City adopts the Statement of Facts as presented by both

Payson City and UTA.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.
SETTING TAX LEVIES OR RATES IS A LEGISLATIVE
ACTION.
Both UTA and Payson City, for completely different reasons,
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invite this Court to make a non-existent and improper
classification of the setting of municipal tax levies as,
variously, "legislative", "administrative" or "ministerial".

UTA

argues to this Court that, because Payson City's utility revenue
tax was a "new" tax, it was "legislative".

This apparently

implies that, at least possibly, the revision of rates of an
existing tax may be "administrative".

(Brief of UTA p. 20.)

UTA

then contradictorily contends that the terms "budget" and "tax
levy" as used in Section 20-11-21(2) refer:
Solely to the ministerial processes associated with
administering a budget or setting a tax levy pursuant
to legislative fiat and does not include the
legislative decisions taken in appropriating money for
a budget, enacting a new taxing scheme, or in setting a
tax rate which involves a policy choice rather than
ministerial arithmetic calculations.
(Brief of UTA, p. 26.) Apparently UTA is arguing that some
aspects of tax "legislation" are not, in fact, "legislation" but
are, instead, "administrative" or "ministerial".
Payson City also confusingly takes both sides of the issue
as to whether or not setting tax rates is "legislative" or
"administrative".

Arguing that setting budgets and tax levies is

part of the complex process of government, Payson City contends
that these activities are not simply "administrative" or
"ministerial".

(Brief of Payson City, pp. 22-27.)

On the other

hand, Payson City tries to rely on Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty
Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954) by arguing that Payson's
enactment of a utility tax was "as administrative act" and
therefore not subject to the legislative referendum provisions of
4

Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The City, as amicus, suggests that this Court decline to
participate in the semantic gymnastics suggested by both UTA and
Payson City.

Simply put, enacting a new tax, repealing an

existing tax, or changing the rates of a tax are legislative
acts.

They are inseparably intertwined with establishing public

policy and the exercise of the legislative "power of the purse"
that is the core function of legislative power.

This is

especially true in a jurisdiction, such as the City, which has an
elected executive and a separate legislative branch.

Martindale

v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
Specifically, the municipal council of a municipality
adopting either the council-mayor or council-manager form of
government is solely empowered to pass budgetary and taxing
ordinances.

Section 10-3-1210, U.C.A.

Determining the appropriate types of taxes and their rates
involves policy questions and sophisticated calculations as to
what monies will be raised by the various taxes and their rates.
These issues, however, do not render the setting of rates
"administrative" or "ministerial" as suggested by UTA and Payson
City.

Rather, they demonstrate the essential "legislative"

character of the matters.

Enacting taxes and establishing their

rates are part of the complex legislative process of matching
revenue with spending, meeting ongoing legal bond requirements,
funding capital projects and, otherwise, establishing the policy
of government that is properly vested in the legislature.
5

In adopting budgets and taxes the legislative body of a
municipality must follow the detailed provisions of the Uniform
Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah cities, Section 10-6-1, et seq. ,
U.C.A.

This process includes, specifically, the setting of

property tax levies and the calculation and enactment of other
necessary taxes and rates so that the budgets are balanced.

See

Sections 10-6-109, 110, 117, 120 and 134.
This case does not involve the administrative/ministerial
function of the executive branch of government applying a
legislatively adopted tax rate to a specific property or
taxpayer.

Instead, the questioned tax was a new revenue

producing scheme, adopted by ordinance as part of the legislative
process of raising and spending the funds necessary to operate
Payson City.

It will not serve clarity or predictability of the

law to judicially create some "administrative"-"legislative"
dichotomy to analyze referendum law in Utah.1
There is no profit to be gained by this Court in
characterizing certain parts of the enactment of tax levies or
rates as "legislative" and other parts as "administrative" or
"ministerial".

Instead, this Court should straightforwardly

declare that the enactment of taxes and the setting of tax rates

x

For the last several years the bench, bar and citizens of
Utah have been involved in trying to understand the earlier
semantic distinction made under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions. See,
Section 63-30-1, et seq., U.C.A. and Standiford v. Salt Lake
City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). We all now are struggling with
the new semantic concept of "core" governmental functions versus
"non-core".
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by municipalities is a "legislative" action.

The Court should

then face, squarely, the next two logical issues.

First, is the

municipal establishment of a tax or the setting of a tax rate
precluded from being the subject of a referendum pursuant to
Section 20-11-21, U.C.A.?

Second, if such a referendum is

prohibited, is Section 20-11-21 unconstitutional pursuant to
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah?

Such a

straightforward analysis is in the best interests of the State.
II.
SETTING TAX LEVIES OR RATES IS NOT SUBJECT TO
REFERENDUM PURSUANT TO SECTION 20-1121(2)(b), U.C.A.
Given that the enactment of taxes and their rates are
"legislative", the next issue for this Court is whether or not
Section 20-11-21(2)(b), U.C.A., prohibits such a legislative act
from being referred to the voters.

The City concurs with Payson

City that such a referendum is specifically prohibited.

The City

adopts and concurs with the arguments made in Points III and
IV(A).

(The City's disagreement with Payson's Point IV(B)(2) is

stated in Point IV of this Brief, below.)
In addition to the arguments made by Payson City, the City
also raises another principle of statutory construction in
support of the argument that Section 20-11-21(2)(b) prohibits
referendums on budgets and tax levies. Besides the fact that
subsection 21(2)(b) is clear on its face and without need for any
Procrustean semantics, it is also true that subsection (b) must
be read in conjunction with subsection 21(2)(a).
7

A basic

principle of statutory construction is that provisions should be
read in light of each other and interpreted as a whole to make
sense.

Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974).

Thus, the phrasing of subsection (a) can be used as a guide
to what was meant by subsection (b). Subsection (a) deals with
initiatives and is phrased in dual pairs.

That is, voters cannot

initiate or change budgets and voters may not [initiate] or
change tax levies.

It is, therefore, clear that when enacting

subsection (a) the legislature was prohibiting direct legislation
not just on tax rates (or levies) but also on the initiation of
taxation itself.
The legislature's phraseology changed for understandable
reasons when enacting subsection (b). As opposed to subsection
(a)'s dual pairs, subsection (b) simply prohibits the reference
of adopted budgets or tax levies to the voters.

The obvious

reason for the semantic shift is that once the budgets and tax
levies have been adopted by the governing body there is no longer
any logical need to refer to the dichotomy between initiation and
changing.

Thus, when subsection (b) is viewed in light of its

logical counterpart, subsection (a), it is clear that subsection
(b) is not subject to the convoluted reasoning implied by UTA
that purports to distinguish between the implementation of a
"new" tax (which UTA claims may be subject to a referendum) and
the change in the rate of an existing tax (which UTA implies may
not be subject to a referendum).

In fact, Section 20-11-21(2)(b)

prohibits the submission of any municipal tax legislation, either
8

enacting new taxes or modifying the rates of existing taxes, to
the voters.
The legislature's preclusion of both initiatives and
referendums on taxes and rates is a recognition of the needs of
practical governance.

In fact, if budgets and taxes could be

referred or initiated the result would be chaos and anarchy.
For example, the Utah Fiscal Procedures Act requires that
all revenue sources be first determined.

Thereafter, the

property tax rate is adjusted, as a last resort to balance the
proposed expenditures.

10-6-111(e), U.C.A.

The final budget

must be completed before June 22 of each year (August 17 in case
of a rate increase as defined by law).

The proposed property tax

rate is then forwarded to the State Tax Commission, which must
certify the rate as within the rate cap of .007 and in compliance
with law.

10-6-133 U.C.A.; 59-2-919, 923 U.C.A.

The dates for these taxing events and review are tailored to
the practical resolution of getting assessments adopted, levied
and collected against thousands of individual parcels of property
on levies by numerous overlapping taxing jurisdictions.
generally Chapter 2 of Title 59 U.C.A.).

(See

Allowing referendums on

any one of the City's taxing sources would make the local
government's ability to honestly set a property tax levy (the tax
of last resort) virtually impossible.

A referendum challenge or

threat would simply force the legislative body to gamble funding
governmental services on the vagaries of a popular vote or
attempt to clandestinely inflate revenue from stable revenue
9

sources.

Either prospect is contrary to the policy of the Fiscal

Procedures Act.

This law requires total anticipated revenues to

equal expenditures and makes it illegal to have expenditures in
excess of budgeted appropriations.

Section 10-6-110(2) U.C.A.

Given the low level of voter signatures required to force
initiatives or referendums it is possible that a city might
literally never get a budget.

If the UTA were successful,

virtually every item on the revenue side of a budget, and by
implication the expenditure side, would be subject to a
referendum.

The paralysis that would occur while the budget sat

ineffectual until the next election would seriously impair
governmental ability to pay bonded obligations or even continue
the most basic of operations.
Would the taxes be collected during the budget's period of
suspended animation?

Would City employees such as police and

fire personnel be paid during the suspension?

From what source?

Merely to raise these issues illustrates the wisdom of the
legislative decision that budgets and taxation in our
representative form of government cannot be subject to either
initiatives or referendums.
III.
SECTION 20-11-21(2)(b) IS NOT BARRED BY
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Having reasoned that the enactment of taxes and their rates
is a legislative function of a municipal government, and that
such actions are specifically prohibited from being the subject
10

of a referendum by Section 20-11-21(2)(b), the next issue before
this Court is whether or not that section violates Article VI,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution-

The City contends that it

does not.
The City concurs with Payson City that the provisions of
Article VI, Section 1 are not "self-effectuating".

That is,

without legislative enactment the provisions of Article VI
Section 1 are simply inchoate and without effect - a right
without a remedy.

Because Article VI, Section 1 specifies that

the legislature may impose conditions upon the power of
referendum and initiative such activities may not take place
beyond those lawfully set conditions.

This must be true because,

absent specific requirements in the Constitution, what does
Article VI, Section 1 mean?

How many voters constitute the

"fractional part" entitled to require initiatives and referendum?
What is the "manner" by which such initiatives and referendum may
be considered?

What is the "time" for holding such initiatives

and referendum?
The Constitution is an organic document meant to provide the
philosophy and framework for government.

It is not meant to

provide all of the nitty gritty details of governmental
operation.

The Constitution, therefore, allows the legislature

to condition the power of referendum and initiative.

The

legislature has seen fit to condition that power by precluding
its exercise in the case of budgets and tax levies. As noted
above, practical government supports the legislative preclusion.
11

Section 20-11-21(2) is well within the power to "condition"
referendums and initiatives allowed by Article VI, Section 1 of
the Utah Constitution.
IV.
MUNICIPALLY ESTABLISHED TAX RATES ARE NOT A
MATTER OF "STATE-WIDE" CONCERN.
In an attempt to explain another reason why tax levies
should not be subject to referendum, Payson City contends that
its utility tax is of "state-wide concern" and thus not subject
to a referendum pursuant to Burkett v. Youngs, 135 Maine 459, 199
A. 619 (1938), cited with approval in Dewey, supra.

While it is

true that the ability of a municipality to tax a state regulated
utility is limited by state statute, that fact is not tantamount
to making an individual city tax a state-wide issue.
This Court has upheld the Public Service Commission's ruling
that all local tax impositions are to be added as surcharges to
the service tariffs. As such, all City tax assessments are
imposed only within that city and have no state-wide impact.
Qgden v. Public Service Commission, 123 Utah 437, 260 P.2d 751
(1953).Thus, so long as the municipality's tax on a utility
complies with the provisions of Chapter 26 of Title 11, there is
no state-wide interest in the tax.
Payson City has obviously made its "state-wide concern"
argument on a "make weight" basis.

The City, as amicus curiae,

urges this Court to reject basing its ruling in any way on this
argument.

Such a ruling could only add confusion to the law as

it might be construed with unanticipated consequences in future
12

matters.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of taxes and setting of tax rates is a
"legislative" action at the heart of the existence of municipal
government.

This Court should not enter into a semantic thicket

attempting to divide local government taxation between
"legislative", "administrative" and "ministerial" functions for
the purposes of determining which part thereof might be subject
to referendums or initiatives.
The power to tax and establish budgets is the ultimate
"legislative" action by local governments.

As such, it is, in

its entirety, specifically precluded from being the subject of
voter initiatives or referendums pursuant to Section 20-1121(2)(b) Utah Code Ann., 1953. The referendum statute is clear,
especially when its two subsections are construed together, and
the UTA's deconstructionist reading is both illogical and
unavailing.

Allowing budgets and tax levies to be the subject of

initiatives or referendum would ensure that local government's
finances and operations descended into chaos and anarchy.
Because Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
allows the legislature to condition the rights of referendum and
initiative the constitutional provision is not "selfeffectuating".

Instead, the reasonable conditions imposed by

Section 20-11-21 Utah Code Ann, are precisely in keeping with the
letter and the spirit of Article VI, Section 1.

They are also

necessary for the continued reasonable functioning of municipal
13

government.
Finally, this Court should decline Payson City's invitation
to declare that municipal taxes are a matter of state-wide
concern.
Because local taxation is a legislative action specifically
precluded from referendum and initiative this Court should affirm
the District Court's decision dismissing UTA's claims.
DATED this ^

u

day of June, 1992.

'/

KCGER r. CUTLER
City Attorney

UJCE R. BAIRD
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake City
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